Abstract: This paper addresses the issue of enforcement powers of coastal states within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the situations in which those powers may be exercised against ships navigating in this zone. It reflects upon the nature of the powers conferred upon coastal states, as well as the safeguards that are imposed upon the exercise of those powers. In particular, the paper will consider how the law of the sea strikes a balance between the interest of coastal states in ensuring that rules and regulations in the EEZ are enforced and the interest of flag states in ensuring that there is no encroachment upon legitimate freedom of navigation. The paper will consider the relevant provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, as well as how these provisions have been interpreted and applied in practice in the jurisprudence of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.
Introduction
One of the major outcomes of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) was the extension of coastal state jurisdiction. Delegates agreed to the creation of a number of new maritime zones, one of the most significant of which was the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). According to this new doctrine, the coastal states were granted sovereign rights and exclusive jurisdiction over a range of issues in waters up to 200 nautical miles from their coast. Within the EEZ, coastal state has sovereign rights overs living and non-living resources, as well as 'other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone.'
1 Coastal states also have sovereign jurisdiction over the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures, marine scientific research, and the protection and preservation of the marine environment. 2 At the same time, the interests of other states were protected and they continued to enjoy, 'subject to the relevant provisions of [the] Convention', certain fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of navigation. 3 Thus, in interpreting and applying the Convention, it is necessary to bear in mind the balance between the interests of coastal states and flag states. This paper will address the extent of enforcement powers conferred upon coastal states within the EEZ and the situations in which those powers may be exercised against ships navigating in this zone. The arrest and detention of foreign vessels was considered to be 'a particularly sensitive matter' 4 during the negotiation of the Convention. Maritime states, defending their interest in navigational freedom,
were not willing to confer comprehensive powers of enforcement on coastal states in this new zone. Thus, an important part of the compromise negotiated at UNCLOS III was the imposition of certain safeguards associated with the exercise of these new competences. It is the nature and scope of these safeguards that will be the focus of this paper.
There is no single set of safeguards that apply to all of the enforcement powers conferred on the coastal state. Rather, the safeguard provisions are to be found scattered throughout the Convention. The paper will explore the range of safeguards that are applied to enforcement powers in the EEZ, but also discuss the nature of these safeguards and what they tell us about the balance between coastal state jurisdiction and freedom of navigation. Many of these safeguards employ terms such as 'necessary', 'reasonable' or appropriate' in order to delineate this balance. As noted by Franckx, the use of such drafting techniques postpones the decision as to the precise balance between coastal state and flag state interests. 5 Essentially, the drafters chose to delegate the task of striking the balance to courts and tribunals in interpreting and applying the Convention. Thus, the analysis provides an opportunity to reflect upon the jurisprudence that has emerged since the entry into force of the Convention and to assess whether it provides satisfactory guidance on this important topic.
Powers of Arrest in the EEZ and Applicable Safeguards
The Convention does not have a single provision on the ability of a coastal state to arrest vessels suspected of violating its laws and regulations in the EEZ. Rather, the issue is addressed in relation to each individual competence. In some cases, the Convention is explicit in detailing the enforcement powers of the coastal state. In therefore one must first enquire whether such powers exist, before asking what limits may apply thereto.
Powers of Arrest and Specific Safeguards in relation to Fisheries Offences
One of the driving forces behind the establishment of the EEZ was the demand by many coastal states for stronger rights to the living resources in their adjacent waters.
The issue had been raised at previous law of the sea conferences, yet it had not been possible to reach a settlement. 6 Nevertheless, the issue continued to cause problems. 7 Finally, a compromise was reached whereby coastal states were granted sovereign rights for the purposes of conserving and managing fish stocks within 200 nautical miles of the territory. 8 Foreign fishing vessels were only permitted access to those living resources with the agreement of the coastal state.
The power of a coastal state to exercise enforcement powers over foreign fishing vessels is explicitly addressed in Article 73 of the Convention. 9 Coastal states can exercise enforcement powers both against vessels which are not authorized to fish in its EEZ, as well as to ensure compliance with laws and regulations by those vessels which are authorized to fish therein. Amongst the enforcement measures explicitly listed in Article 73(1) are 'boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings.'
Thus, there is no doubt that the officials of the coastal state may stop and search a suspect vessel and, if there is evidence of a violation, they may bring the vessel to port and start criminal proceedings in national courts.
However, this power is also subject to certain safeguards, designed to ensure that the coastal state does not encroach upon the legitimate rights and interests of other states when exercising these powers. First and foremost, Article 73(1) requires that enforcement measures taken by the coastal state must be 'necessary.' This necessity standard is central to determining the balance between coastal state rights 6 The issue had been dealt with in Articles 6-7 of the 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation on the High Seas, but many states remained unsatisfied with this solution and the treaty received very little support. Coastal state rights over fish stocks was thus one of the questions that was submitted to the Second UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, but this conference was also unable to come to a satisfactory compromise. Conference Resolution II simply noted that 'the development of international law affecting fishing may lead to changes in practices and requirements of many states.' 7 Notably, a major dispute over the rights of a coastal state to regulate fisheries in its coastal waters was brought to the It must also be borne in mind that whether or not an enforcement measure is necessary will depend upon the facts of the particular case. In relation to the inspection and arrest of vessels engaged in fishing the EEZ, the coastal state should arguably have greater discretion. According to one author, the coastal state may inspect fishing vessels 'as a matter of right.' 15 Indeed, the exercise of this power would appear to be necessary for the coastal state to ensure that its national laws and regulations are being followed by fishing vessels. However, the more intrusive the powers exercised by the coastal state, the more justification they may require.
Therefore, the decision to arrest a vessel may not always be necessary unless there is some evidence of an offence. In other words, Article 73(1) would appear to contain an implicit evidential threshold for the exercise of enforcement powers, requiring there to be reasonable grounds for believing that an offence has taken place.
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Similarly, if a foreign fishing vessel is merely navigating through the EEZ, it is arguable that a coastal state should have to show some evidence that an offence has been committed before exercising any enforcement powers over that vessel. This would be the case even in the case of an inspection of the vessel, as inspection itself amounts to an interference with the freedom of navigation being exercised by the vessel. Again, it is appropriate to impose a minimum evidential threshold on the coastal state to prevent it from abusing its enforcement powers.
Yet, in both situations, the evidential threshold should not be set too high.
Doing so, would undermine the sovereign rights of the coastal state. We will return to this issue when discussing the necessity of penalties below. It is also clear from Article 60(2) that the coastal state does not have complete discretion in determining whether to exercise its enforcement powers. There are a number of conditions which attach to the powers of the coastal state in this context.
Powers of Arrest and Specific Safeguards in relation to
Firstly, the laws and regulations which are being enforced must be necessary and reasonable in the first place. In this regard, the Convention explicitly requires that 'artificial islands, installations and structures and the safety zones around them may not be established where interference may be caused to the use of recognized sea lanes essential to international navigation.' 42 Thus, the impact on freedom of navigation should be limited at the outset by the design of the safety zones. The
Convention also requires that enforcement measures must be 'appropriate.' As with the safeguards that are applicable to the other rights in the EEZ, the interpretation of this provision requires the striking of a balance between the rights of the coastal state and the interests of other states. 43 Yet, the choice of the term 'appropriate' would seem to suggest a margin of appreciation for the coastal state at least as broad as the case of fisheries offences, if not broader. It follows that there will be very few situations in which the arrest and prosecution of vessels for the violation of a safety zone will not be appropriate. 43 See Attard (n 40) 91: 'the framework proposed by Article 60 attempts to create a balance between the exclusive right to establish artificial islands etc., and the community's navigational interests.' 44 Law of the Sea Convention, Art. 56(1)(b)(ii). 45 Ibid, Art. 246(1). 46 Ibid, Art. 246(2)-(6). 47 Attard (n 40) 117.
The Power of Arrest and Specific Safeguards in relation to

General Safeguards on the Power of Arrest in the EEZ
In addition to the specific safeguards on arrest discussed above, there are a number of other conditions that apply to the exercise of this power over vessels in the EEZ. The problem with the approach of the Tribunal in this case is that it is not entirely clear that it had jurisdiction to deal with a claim based on rules that are not contained in the Convention. 
Notification in Cases of Arrest or Detention of Foreign Vessels
Once an arrest has taken place in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Convention, a series of other obligations are potentially triggered. The first of these obligations is the duty to notify the flag state of the arrest.
Where the coastal state has arrested or detained a foreign fishing vessel, Article 73(4) establishes a duty of the coastal state to 'promptly notify the flag state, through appropriate channels, of action taken and of any penalties subsequently imposed.' The provision leaves it to the discretion of the coastal state to choose an appropriate channel. 
Prompt Release in the Case of Fisheries Offences
If the coastal state does exercise its powers of arrest in relation to fisheries vessels, Article 73(2) provides that it must offer to promptly release the vessels or crew, The principal obligation in Article 73(2) is to release the vessel upon payment of a bond. Thus, the arresting state is under an obligation to set a bond. The
Convention does not specify the precise procedures that must be followed by the In the Volga Case, the Respondent also challenged the bail conditions imposed on the crew members. Initially, the crew members had been released from custody, but they had been required to surrender their passports and seaman's papers to the Australian authorities and to stay within the Perth metropolitan area. After appealing these bail conditions, the crew concerned were permitted to return to Spain, but they were required to surrender their passports and seaman's papers to the Australian embassy in Madrid, and they were also required to report monthly to consular officials. The Tribunal did not deal with this point in its decision. 82 However, in light of its reasoning on the other aspects of the case, it is likely that any nonfinancial conditions attached to the release of the crew would also be contrary to the requirements of Article 73 (2).
Prompt Release in the Case of Environmental Offences
The other situation in which the Convention expressly establishes an obligation of prompt release is in relation to environmental offences. There are two relevant provisions in the Convention, one of which has a more general application than the other. to release the vessel or to make it conditional are also subject to challenge using the Article 292 procedure and it will be up to the relevant court or tribunal to decide whether the decision is 'reasonable.' As with the case of fisheries offences, it is suggested that the coastal state should be given a margin of appreciation and the court or tribunal should only intervene if the decision of the coastal state was not supported by any evidence or arbitrary. In making such an assessment, a court or tribunal may also have to take into account the precautionary approach which implies that a further degree of deference should be given to the coastal state when there is uncertainty about the risks posed to the environment. . 90 Ibid, para. 53. 91 Ibid, para. 73. 92 However, see, to the contrary, Treves (n 83) 186: '… it would seem possible to resort to the prompt release procedure in other cases also. There are cases in which the Convention prohibits detention of ships and crews. If a vessel of its crew has been detained in contravention of the Convention which applicability and it would not be available for all situations in which the coastal state has exercised its enforcement powers in relation to the EEZ. 93 In particular, the prompt release procedure would not be available for the exercise of enforcement powers in relation to jurisdiction over marine scientific research or jurisdiction over artificial islands, installations and structures.
At the same time, the limited availability of the prompt release procedure under Article 292 does not mean that the release of a vessel cannot be requested through international dispute settlement procedures. In practice, states have sought to make requests for provisional measures in order to achieve this aim. to immediately release the crew members of the 'Arctic Sunrise', and allow them to leave the territory and maritime areas under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation…' prohibits detention, it seems reasonable to hold that the most expeditious procedures available should be resorted to in order to ensure the release of the vessel or crew, independently of the question of international responsibility for the violation of the Convention.' However, this argument ignores that Article 292 refers to provisions of the Convention 'for the prompt release of the vessel or crew', not provisions of the Convention relating to detention. As noted below, the flag state could in these circumstances apply for the release of the vessel or crew as a provisional measure. 
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These arguments do bear some weight but the decision of whether or not to release must ultimately come down to a weighing and balancing the rights of either side to the dispute. Such a balancing process between the rights of the applicant and the respondent is inherent in the prescription of provisional measures, in the same way that it is in prompt release proceedings. Rather the decision to order a release or not will also depend upon the outcome of the weighing and balancing process. Similarly, a weighing and balancing process will determine the amount of a bond associated with the release of the vessel.
Moreover, it should also be noted that release as a provisional measure does not necessarily depend upon the posting of a bond and it is perfectly possible to order the release of a vessel as a provisional measure without any financial security at all.
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Again, this will depend upon the rights being exercised by the coastal state and the facts of a particular case. Thus, the decision of whether or not to order the release of a vessel as a provisional measure is another example of international courts and tribunals playing a central role in upholding the balance of interests between coastal state rights and the interests of other states.
Limits on Penalties to be imposed by Coastal state for EEZ Offences
Generally speaking, it is up to the authorities of a state to determine what is an appropriate punishment for a particular offence. As a matter of principle, states should be considered to have a broad discretion in this regard, subject to any express conditions imposed by international law. The Law of the Sea Convention only contains provisions on this subject matter in relation to fisheries offences and environmental offences.
Penalties for Fisheries Offences
Article 73 also deals with the powers of a coastal state to impose punishments for violations of fisheries laws and regulations if an offender is found guilty at trial.
Firstly, it completely prohibits corporal punishment for fisheries offences. Presumably, the reference would include international human rights provisions relating to the right to a fair trial. In other words, ITLOS has conferred on itself the power to step inside the courtroom and to determine whether national courts are complying with international human rights standards when trying fisheries cases.
In this context, the Tribunal has also decided that penalties for fisheries offences must pass the necessity test included in Article 73(1). 111 As noted above, the concept of 'necessary' is ambiguous and it should be applied with care to enforcement measures. This is particularly the case in relation to the imposition of penalties. In the Virginia G Case, the Tribunal applied the necessity test at two levels.
holding of passports amounted to imprisonment, in violation of the Convention; M/V Virginia G Case (n 13) paras 308, 310. See however, the Separate Opinion of Judge Lucky, para. 50 who says 'the word "imprisonment" in article 73, paragraph 3, must be given a wide and generous meaning. The meaning ascribed ought not to be that the individual must be sent to a prison and confined in cell. The term imprisonment means the restraint of a person contrary to his will; in other words it means a deprivation of one's liberty. As to what will amount to imprisonment, the most obvious modes are confinement in a prison or private house (in this case a ship). In my view the crew were deprived of their right to liberty and freedom.' He does not explain, however, why the term imprisonment must be given a 'wide and generous meaning' and not its 'ordinary meaning' in light of the context and object and purpose, as required by order to determine that it was a necessary measure.
Secondly, and more decisively, the necessity test was also applied to the concrete application of a penalty in a particular case. 114 It is in this context that the Tribunal found, by a majority, that the confiscation of the M/V Virginia and the gas oil on board were not necessary, despite the fact that it accepted that the offence committed by the vessel was a 'serious violation.' 115 A number of 'mitigating factors' 116 were considered by the Tribunal in reaching this decision. In particular, it took into account the fact that Guinea Bissau had been informed of the bunkering activities, even though the proper procedures for authorization had not been followed. 117 It also took into account that the other vessels involved in the bunkering operations were not confiscated and it concluded that 'the confiscation of the vessel and the gas oil on board in the circumstances of the present case was not necessary either to sanction the violation committed or to deter the vessels and their operators from repeating this violation.' 118 In practice, the approach of the Tribunal appears to be closer to a proportionality test, given that the aims of the measure are weighed against the means through which they are carried out. 119 The approach of the Tribunal can be seen as problematic in two ways.
Firstly, it must be wondered whether the necessity test should be applied to penalties at all. As noted by Judge Kulyk in his declaration, enforcement measures should be distinguished from sanctions for offences. 120 Secondly, the way in which the necessity was applied would seem to be too prescriptive, leaving little discretion to the coastal state. In their joint dissenting opinion, Vice President Hoffman and Judges Rao, Marotta Rangel, Kateka, Gao, and
Bouguetaia stressed the importance of granting a margin of appreciation to the coastal state in making enforcement decisions in relation to fisheries offences and they criticized the Tribunal for having functioned more akin to an appellate authority. 121 The dissenting judges suggested that the Tribunal should only exercise the power of implies that the coastal state should have a degree of deference in deciding whether to take enforcement action. Nevertheless, the discretion of a coastal state cannot be unlimited and the safeguards in the Convention provide an important check against the excessive exercise of enforcement powers in a way that would undermine the rights and interests of other state. However, the effectiveness of these safeguards also depends upon the availability of an international court or tribunal to intervene when it was alleged that a coastal state had exceeded its powers.
Penalties for Environmental Offences in the EEZ
The Law of the Sea Convention is well-known for its dispute settlement procedure. Generally speaking, any party can bring a claim against another party to the Convention if a dispute exists between them, provided that they satisfy certain procedural prerequisites. 131 Where such a procedure exists, the safeguards provide an effective mechanism to uphold the balance of rights inherent in the Convention regime. island, installation or structure would not fall within the scope of this exclusion. 135 It follows that there is more likelihood that these safeguards will be enforceable in practice and they will prove a more effective limit on the powers of the coastal state in the EEZ.
Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated the range of safeguards that apply to coastal states when exercising their enforcement powers in the EEZ. Some of these safeguards are appreciation in deciding whether EEZ enforcement action is reasonable, appropriate or necessary for the purposes of the Convention. This view not only better reflects the nature of the rights and jurisdiction possessed by the coastal state in this zone, but it also prevents international courts and tribunals from stepping beyond their judicial character and substituting their own decisions for those of the coastal state authorities.
